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Abstract
In this paper we provide a micro-foundation for wage rigidity in a simple and tractable
model of wage setting behavior, inspired by a synthesis of recent convergent insights
from anthropological and experimental research, and drawing on concepts advanced
in the behavioral economics literature. The core principles underlying our theory
are contractual incompleteness, fairness, reciprocity, and reference dependence and
loss aversion in the evaluation of wage contracts by workers. The model establishes a
wage-effort relationship that captures a worker’s asymmetric reference-dependent reci-
procity, in which loss aversion implies effort responds more strongly to wage changes
below the reference wage than above it. This basic relationship gives rise to wage
rigidity around a worker’s reference wage. We explore these implications further in
a simple dynamic stochastic environment in which a worker adapts their feelings of
entitlement once they become employed. The model allows us to shed new light on
the importance of anticipated negative reciprocity and the cost of wage rigidity for a
farsighted firm’s hiring and wage setting behavior.
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1 Introduction
Virtually every macroeconomic model of the business cycle—be it based on efficiency
wages, search frictions, New Keynesian imperfections, or a combination of these—requires
wage rigidity to be built-in to sufficiently explain unemployment fluctuations. Whilst com-
pelling reasons might be advanced to assume wage rigidity, a convincing microeconomic
account of wage setting behavior that captures what we know of employment relationships
is much more desirable. When discussing workers’ basic predispositions against wage re-
ductions Okun [1981, p.10] noted “This is a plausible story, even though it cannot be
deduced from a basic utility function!” and some three decades later Elsby [2009, p.155,
footnote 2] reminds us that this gap in the literature remains: “Given the empirical evi-
dence for worker resistance to wage cuts, it is surprising that there has not yet been an
explicit model of such wage rigidity in the literature”. The aim of this paper is to provide
a theoretical foundation for wage rigidity in a simple and tractable microeconomic model
of wage setting, inspired by ideas advanced in the behavioral economics literature and a
synthesis of recent convergent insights from anthropological and experimental research.
Our model accounts for workers assessing the fairness of the wage they are paid in
relation to their reference ‘fair’ wage, and responding to this with their choice of effort.
Consideration of the worker’s perceptions of fairness and the particular impact of unfair
wages on morale and productivity for loss averse workers influence the optimal wage setting
policy of a firm, tempering the incentive to adjust the wage to exogenous changes in
external market conditions and hence giving rise to wage rigidity. In addition, the paper
makes two further key contributions: i) it offers a psychological foundation for asymmetric
reciprocity, identifying loss aversion as the driver of negative reciprocity being stronger
than positive reciprocity; and ii) it analyzes the implications of ‘asymmetric reference-
dependent reciprocity’ and anticipated wage rigidity for a firm’s hiring and wage setting
behavior in a dynamic decision making environment.
The basic premise of our theory is that there is contractual incompleteness over effort
in an employment relationship, which is at least in part discretionary. A worker evaluates
the fairness of the wage they are paid relative to a reference ‘fair’ wage. A wage that
exceeds the reference wage is perceived as a gift, whilst if it falls below the reference wage
it is perceived as unfair. Central to our model is the inclusion of a ‘morale function’ in the
worker’s payoff, which measures their evaluation of the productive effort they undertake
in light of the fairness of the wage they are paid: if the worker is paid a wage they
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perceive as a gift they will receive an increase in utility from increasing their effort (a
gift to the firm); whilst if they perceive their wage to be unfair the worker’s utility will
increase by reducing their effort (reducing the firm’s payoff). As such, a worker’s payoff
exhibits both positive and negative reciprocity, which stems from their reference-dependent
preferences. In addition, by allowing for the worker to be loss averse, which implies
that unfair wages generate a disproportionate decrease in payoff, our theory captures an
asymmetry in reciprocity—negative reciprocity is stronger than positive reciprocity—that
seems a prevalent behavioral feature of employment relationships.
The inclusion of reciprocity establishes a wage-effort relationship in which the optimal
effort of the worker is increasing in the wage paid. If a worker is loss averse the asymmetry
between the effect of negative and positive reciprocity implies there is a kink in the optimal
effort function at the reference wage. We define this wage-effort relationship as the worker’s
‘asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity’. If a firm is considering paying a loss averse
worker below their reference wage there will be a relatively large negative impact on their
effort and consequent reduction in the output produced, consideration of which gives rise
to wage rigidity.
We explore the implications of our theory in a simple two-period dynamic stochas-
tic environment in which the evolution of the match productivity is uncertain, and the
worker adapts their feelings of entitlement once they become employed: whilst the worker’s
reference wage at the start of the employment relationship is exogenously given, in the
subsequent period of employment it is endogenously determined by the wage paid in the
initial employment contract. As the employment relationship passes from one period to
the next the firm may seek to renegotiate the wage with the worker due to changes in
the state of the economy: for instance, absent other considerations, the firm may want
to cut the worker’s wage following a decline in the match productivity. However, the
consequences for morale, effort and productivity of doing so may outweigh the benefit.
Such downward rigidity of the initial wage contract is therefore an inherent feature of our
dynamic model, driven by the worker’s adaptation of the reference wage and the relatively
large cost to the firm of negative reciprocity that stems from loss aversion. A farsighted
firm will anticipate the future cost of negative reciprocity, understanding the persistence
and irreversibility of the initial wage within an employment relationship. Consequently,
they will adjust their behavior in the initial period. A key insight that arises from our
model is that the anticipation of the worker’s negative reciprocity during the employment
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relationship puts downward pressure on the initial wage offered to a loss averse worker
and, since loss aversion generally reduces the value of an employment contract, upward
pressure on the firm’s hiring reservation productivity.
Our model can support a narrative that accounts for several aspects of wage setting
behavior in the employment relationship, explain stylized facts of labour markets, and
also provide novel insights and interpretations of worker and firm behavior. For instance,
our framework accounts for: asymmetries in intensity and persistence of reciprocity; the
rationale for increasing wage profiles; the coexistence of upward and downward wage
rigidity which depends on the initial employment conditions; and the importance of wage
rigidity for hiring behavior by distinguishing newly hired workers’ wages from those of
incumbents.
Being based on established principles in behavioral economics, our approach has the
advantage of being clear about the nature of the behavioral forces at play, their driving
factors and their implications, which contributes to our understanding of wage rigidity in
employment relationships. By considering that workers’ evaluation of wages is reference
dependent, our model captures both positive and negative reciprocity and identifies loss
aversion as the source of wage rigidity. Akerlof [1982] captured what we now know as
positive reciprocity in a model of gift exchange, and Akerlof and Yellen [1990] in their
fair wage-effort hypothesis considered what we now know as negative reciprocity; by in-
corporating both and deriving, rather than assuming, the effort response of workers to
wages offered, we can consider the relative strength of these two effects. The nature of
the employment relationship that emerges from our analytical framework lends support to
reduced-form relationships that have been assumed in important recent contributions to
the literature, for example, the reduced-form effort function used by Elsby [2009] and the
reduced-form reference-dependent production function implemented by Eliaz and Spiegler
[2013]. Perhaps closest in spirit to our approach is the contribution of Danthine and
Kurmann [2007] who present a macroeconomic model based on micro-foundations, where
workers’ preferences exhibit reciprocity a` la Rabin [1993] from whence gift exchange can
be derived, but they don’t capture asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity, which is
crucial for our results.
In the next section we elucidate our synthesis of the employment relationship. We set
out our model based on contractual incompleteness, fairness, reciprocity, and reference
dependence and loss aversion in section 3, where we also derive the implications for the
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worker’s optimal effort decision and the wage-setting rule of the firm. Section 4 explores
the implications of our model in a simple dynamic framework. In section 5 we discuss the
logical implications of our model in relation to the role of the worker’s reference wage and
the literature on labor markets fluctuations, and section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
All proofs are contained in the appendix.
2 Morale, fairness and reciprocity in employment relation-
ships
There is an emerging consensus in the literature that behavioral concerns such as fairness,
workers’ morale and reciprocity influence firms’ wage setting behavior. These intrinsic
aspects of the employment relationship are also considered to be key behavioral forces that
underly the observation of downward wage rigidity. In this section we argue that these
ideas have been considered in the literature at least since the turn of the twentieth century,
and that it is thanks to recent convergent findings in anthropological and experimental
research combined with theories from behavioral economics that a unified consensus has
emerged. Hence we propose a synthesis of the literature that will provide the underlying
conceptual framework for the theory and the analysis developed in this paper.
2.1 Early insights
That workers’ morale is linked with their perceptions of fairness and their productivity,
and that employers are concerned about these issues when deciding upon wage policies,
has long been acknowledged by economists. Marshall [1890] often expressed the reasons
why employers would pay workers high wages and discussed the negative impacts on
‘efficiency’ and work ‘intensity’ of otherwise lower wages. Slichter [1920] placed workers’
feelings of being treated unfairly as one of the most important causes of low morale and the
resulting non-cooperative behavior of workers towards the employer. Hicks [1963], Solow
[1979] and Okun [1981] advanced similar arguments when discussing the possible sources
of the Keynesian wage floor [Keynes, 1936]: they argued that resistance to cut nominal
wages comes from employers, concerned about the effects of wage cuts on workers’ morale,
‘ability’ and ‘willingness to work’ [Hicks, 1963, p. 94-95]. The gift-exchange model of
Akerlof [1982] and the fair wage-effort hypothesis of Akerlof and Yellen [1990] provide the
first contributions that formalize some of these insights, appealing to what has become
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known in the behavioral economics literature as positive and negative reciprocity.
2.2 Anthropological evidence
Within the last three decades, thanks to the ground-breaking work of several economists
including Blinder and Choi [1990], Campbell and Kamlani [1997], Bewley [1999] and more
recently Galuscak et al. [2012], Druant et al. [2012] and Du Caju et al. [2014], our un-
derstanding of the employment relationship has been greatly enhanced.1 By interviewing
firms’ managers and labor leaders in several countries these studies provide insight into
the validity of the behavioral assumptions advanced in the theoretical literature.
A central finding is that firms’ managers are concerned about treating workers fairly.
Wage reductions that are perceived as unfair damage morale, inducing grievance among
workers who negatively reciprocate the employer with lower effort and productivity [Be-
wley, 2007]. On the other hand wage rises could generate improvements in effort and
cooperation among workers. As such, these findings suggest the existence of a relationship
between wage changes and workers’ effort.
Such a relationship is not universally straightforward, however: for instance Campbell
and Kamlani [1997] find that effort responds more intensely to wage cuts than to increases
in wages, and that any positive effect of wage increases on effort is believed to be temporary
by managers, since workers rapidly get used to the wage received. On the other hand,
wage reductions without impacts on morale are also achievable by employers, though only
when workers understand their necessity in avoiding the firm shutting down or to prevent
mass layoffs [Bewley, 2007].
2.3 Experimental evidence
There is an additional stream of evidence that comes from laboratory and field experi-
ments. Overall the most important finding is confirmation of the existence of reciprocal
behavior in the employment relationship: when people receive extra pay in excess of their
standards of fairness they reciprocate with higher effort (positive reciprocity); when people
perceive they have been treated unfairly they reciprocate by exerting minimum or lower
effort (negative reciprocity). However, field experiments document evidence that positive
reciprocity is weaker than negative reciprocity (see, for instance, Malmendier et al. [2014]).
1Other anthropological studies include those by Kaufman [1984], Baker et al. [1994], Agell and Lundborg
[1995, 2003] and Agell and Bennmarker [2007]. Reviews of this literature can be found in Howitt [2002]
and Bewley [2007].
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In a combined laboratory and field experiment Cohn et al. [2014] try to address this in-
consistency. They infer that positive reciprocity exists but may quickly disappear, which
is consistent with the previously discussed anthropological findings.
One interpretation attributes this result to the asymmetric nature of workers’ reci-
procity behavior: negative reciprocity is stronger than positive reciprocity [Fehr et al.,
2009]. Another interpretation suggests that the weak, or temporary, response of effort to
wage rises is the outcome of a shift of the workers’ standards of fairness to the higher wage
received [Gneezy and List, 2006].
Taken together, evidence from laboratory and field experiments offer complementary
insights into understanding the impacts of wage changes on effort, by reinforcing the
existence of an asymmetric wage-effort relationship.
2.4 The proposed synthesis
We propose a synthesis of a theory of wage setting behavior that captures the essential
features of wage setting and the employment relationship that emerge from several ideas
and perspectives. We build the theory around four core concepts: workers’ morale; their
perceptions of fairness; reciprocity; and contractual incompleteness.
Workers’ Morale. Morale represents the workers’ state of mind when performing a pro-
ductive activity. As concluded by Bewley [2007], good morale is not related to happiness
or job satisfaction, but with the willingness of workers to cooperate and work to achieve
the firm’s goals; and when morale is low workers tend to hold back cooperation and cease
to identify themselves with the firm. We capture the idea that workers’ willingness to exert
effort is directly related to their morale: when morale is good, cooperation is enhanced
and performing the productive activity generates a psychological benefit; when morale is
low, workers are less motivated and the psychological cost of exerting effort increases.
Perceptions of Fairness. Changes in workers’ morale depend on whether workers feel
they are treated fairly by their employer. Following the standard approach in the literature
we capture these perceptions within a reference ‘fair’ wage relative to which the fairness of a
wage contract is evaluated: a wage below the reference wage is perceived as unfair, while a
wage above is perceived as a gift.2 Moreover, by incorporating the intrinsic psychological
2The reference ‘fair’ wage is an artifact that simplifies the broader concept of workers’ perceptions of
fairness. The literature has captured the same concept with other names such as ‘fair wage’ in Marshall
[1890] and Hicks [1963], ‘wage norm’ in Lindbeck and Snower [1986], ‘perceptions of entitlement’ in Kah-
neman et al. [1986], ‘feelings of entitlement’ in Hart and Moore [2008] and ‘the reference frame of fairness
judgements’ in Fehr et al. [2009].
7
aspect of human decision making of loss aversion [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979], we
capture that morale is most affected when workers feel they are being treated unfairly.
This implies that a wage cut below the reference wage (perceived as a loss) has a greater
impact on morale than a wage rise of the same amount (perceived as a gain).3
Reciprocity. The idea that is perhaps most prominent from the literature discussed
is that the employment relationship is based on a mutual understanding of reciprocal
behavior. If a firm sets a wage contract that is considered unfair, workers start to feel
a grievance against the firm and morale will decrease. As a consequence effort will be-
come more psychologically costly and workers will negatively reciprocate the treatment
they perceive as unfair by exerting less effort. A similar response, but in the opposite
direction, would arise if the firm sets a wage that is above the workers’ reference wage.
Moreover, due to the assumption that unfair behavior has a stronger impact on workers’
morale (loss aversion), effort will be more responsive to wage changes that are considered
unfair as opposed to wage changes considered as gifts. Thus, workers are characterized by
intentions-based reciprocity [e.g. Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk
and Fischbacher, 2006], while firms, although self-interested, are concerned about fairness
because of the effect of workers’ responses to wage changes on profitability.4
Contractual Incompleteness. When thinking about firms’ wage setting behavior, and
more generally about the employment contract, we consider a negotiation in which an em-
ployer (the buyer) offers a wage in exchange for productive activity by a worker (the seller).
However, unlike in goods markets, the employer is not able to contract upon the ‘quality’
of workers’ productive activity: effort is discretionary and therefore not contractible. This
peculiarity of labor markets brought Okun [1981] to the conclusion that the employment
relationship is governed by an ‘invisible handshake’ and Williamson [1985] to define the
employment contract as an ‘incomplete agreement’. According to Williamson [1985, p.
262-63], only the minimum job performance can be enforced by the contract (the ‘per-
functory cooperation’), while workers ‘enjoy discretion’ about the quality of their service,
in terms of cooperation, effort and efficiency (the ‘consummate cooperation’). This latter
aspect is influenced by the worker’s evaluation of the fairness of the wage they are offered.
3This assumption is consistent with the evidence reported by surveys and experiments as discussed
above. While wage rises have a weak impact on morale, unfair wage cuts damage workers’ morale due to
an ‘insult effect’ and a ‘standard of living effect’ [Bewley, 2007, p. 161]. Fehr et al. [2009, p. 377] argue
that evidence of such behavior suggests the existence of ‘reference-dependent fairness concerns’.
4This type of reciprocity is conceptually different from the idea of inequity aversion [Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000] used in a model of wage setting by Benjamin [2015]. Malmendier et al.
[2014] compare the various models of reciprocity advanced in the literature.
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The key intuition of our theory is that there is a cost associated with reducing wages. If
workers perceive wage reductions to be unfair their effort and willingness to work will drop,
reducing productivity and influencing the firm’s profitability. Thus the firm’s managers
may refrain from cutting wages in light of adverse economic conditions if, at the margin, the
related cost in the form of negative reciprocity is greater than the benefit of paying lower
wages. This insight confirms the predictions of early prominent hypotheses, and offers
a psychological foundation for it, drawing from recent anthropological and experimental
research.
3 The model
We begin by considering the wage-setting behavior of a firm for a single period of employ-
ment with an established worker to illustrate ideas. The firm learns the match productivity
q and the worker’s exogenously-given reference wage r at the start of the employment pe-
riod. It then decides whether to continue the employment relationship and, if so, the wage
w to offer to the worker. The match productivity is a realization of the random variable Q
which is distributed on [0,∞] with cumulative distribution function F and density func-
tion f , and captures the interaction between the firm’s technology, per-worker capital and
the intrinsic productivity of the worker. For simplicity, we assume the worker will accept
any contract offered.5 After considering the wage in relation to their reference wage, the
worker decides on a (non-negative) level of effort e which generates output for the firm.
Payoffs are then realized, the form of which we describe next.
3.1 Payoffs
The per-worker output in an employment relationship (the price of which is normalized to
one) is a function of both the match productivity and the effort chosen by the worker, and
is denoted y(q, e). The per-worker cost of production is s(w) where w is the wage paid to
the worker. The firm is materially motivated by profit:
pi(w; q, e) = y(q, e)− s(w). (1)
We make the following assumptions:
F1. s′(w) > 0 and s′′(w) ≥ 0 for all w.
5We choose not to include a reservation utility for the worker but it is straightforward to do so, the
effect of which is to add an additional threshold to the model.
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F2. ye(q, e), yq(q, e) > 0, yee(q, e), yqq(q, e) ≤ 0 and yqe(q, e) > 0 for all e and q.
Notice that assumption F2 implies the marginal product of effort is increasing in the match
productivity.
To capture behavior consistent with our synthesis—namely: reference dependence and
loss aversion of the wage in relation to the reference wage; and reciprocity in relation to
the worker’s perception of the fairness of the wage—we specify the worker’s preferences by
an additively separable utility function composed of a wage utility, u, and an effort utility,
v:
U(e;w, r) = u(w, r) + v(e;w, r).
The wage utility u(w, r) represents the worker’s perceived utility from wage evaluations
which we suppose is comprised of a standard utility function and a gain-loss function
n(w|r):
u(w, r) = m(w) + ξn(w|r).
The function m(w) captures the effect of absolute wage levels on the worker’s utility, and
n(w|r) captures the worker’s evaluation of the wage relative to the reference wage, the
functional form of which we define shortly. The parameter ξ ≥ 0 measures the worker’s
subjective weight of relative wage comparisons in the wage utility. We assume:
W1. m′(w) > 0 and m′′(w) < 0 for all w.
The effort utility v(e;w, r) that the worker derives from engaging in productive activity
takes the form
v(e;w, r) = b(e)− c(e) +M(e;w, r),
where b(e) represents the worker’s intrinsic psychological benefit of being productive, and
c(e) their intrinsic psychological and physical cost of productive activity.6 We assume:
W2. b′(e) > 0 and b′′(e) ≤ 0 for all e; c′(e) > 0 and c′′(e) > 0 for all e; and b′(0) > c′(0).
6In our model we want to capture the idea that ‘normal effort’ (i.e. effort that a worker would exert
absent morale considerations) is not zero. This necessitates the inclusion of intrinsic benefits and costs of
productive activity. Whilst this approach contrasts with, for example, shirking models in the efficiency
wage literature (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984]) it is consistent with the idea that workers perceive
positive satisfaction from engaging with productive activity (see, for example, the discussion in Altmann
et al. [2014, Appendix]). Inspired by the findings reported in Bewley [2007], that it is not wage levels but
changes in wages that influence effort, normal effort should be a non-pecuniary concept and is therefore
modeled as being independent of the wage.
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The function M(e;w, r) is the ‘morale function’, a key component of our model that
lies at the heart of many of our results. We specify
M(e;w, r) ≡ g(e)n(w|r) (2)
and make the following assumption:
W3. g′(e) > 0 and g′′(e) = 0 for all e.
This allows us to define g′(e) ≡ ζ > 0, and so we can write M(e;w, r) = ζen(w|r).7
Morale depends on the worker’s evaluation of the wage in relation to the reference wage,
the functional form of which we now define. We assume that n(w|r) ≡ µ(m(w) −m(r))
where µ(·) is a gain-loss value function that exhibits loss aversion in the spirit of Kahneman
and Tversky [1979]. As such, for a loss averse worker the evaluation of utility differences
between the wage and the reference wage will be steeper for wages below the reference
wage than for those above it. We make the following assumption about the functional
form of gain-loss utility.8
W4. µ(0) = 0 and, whilst µ(x) is non-differentiable at x = 0, it is continuous with µ′(x) >
0 and µ′′(x) = 0 for all x 6= 0. Moreover, for any x > 0, µ′(−x)/µ′(x) ≡ λ ≥ 1.
Under this assumption, it follows that the gain-loss utility is piecewise-linear:
n(w|r) ≡ µ(m(w)−m(r)) =
 η(m(w)−m(r)) if w ≥ r andλη(m(w)−m(r)) if w < r (3)
where η > 0 is a scaling parameter that represents the importance of gain-loss utility for
the worker, and λ ≥ 1 represents the worker’s degree of loss aversion.9
The morale function, being dependent on n(w|r), captures an additional psychological
cost/benefit of productive effort associated with the worker’s perception of fairness. If the
wage exceeds the reference wage (it is perceived as a ‘gift’) the worker gains some additional
benefit of productive effort and an increase in effort (a ‘gift’ to the firm) will increase utility.
7From a modelling perspective, the functional form of M(·) is similar to the function used by Danthine
and Kurmann [2007] to derive the workers’ reciprocal gift in terms of effort, in the spirit of Rabin [1993].
Our specification is fundamentally different, however, as we incorporate a gain-loss function in morale that
allows for negative, as well as positive, reciprocity, and asymmetries between the two.
8Assumption W4 closely resembles the assumptions of Ko˝szegi and Rabin [2006] over the properties of
their ‘universal gain-loss function’, except we do not have diminishing sensitivity.
9The gain-loss function enters the worker’s utility twice, crucially in the morale function but also in
the wage utility. Whilst the latter is not important for our theory (indeed, we allow ξ = 0), we believe a
realistic model of wage evaluation should allow loss aversion to influence the utility received from a wage
offer. This would become important if we modeled the worker’s reservation utility.
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If the wage falls short of the reference wage (it is perceived as ‘unfair’) there is an additional
psychological cost of productive effort and a reduction in effort increases utility. As such,
the morale function implies the worker’s payoff exhibits reciprocity, and since morale is
linked to loss aversion, negative reciprocity is stronger than positive reciprocity.
Since we specify that morale depends on effort, these same considerations apply to
the margins of the worker’s payoff function: for a loss averse worker the reduction in the
marginal utility of effort for an unfair wage will be larger than the increase in marginal
utility for a wage an equivalent amount above the reference wage. Consequently, the effect
on optimal effort, which is determined by these margins, will be asymmetric. We now turn
to derive the relationship between effort and the wage.
3.2 The worker’s choice of effort
A worker’s choice of effort after the wage has been set will depend on their evaluation of
the wage in relation to their reference wage. Given a reference wage r and a wage offer w
the worker will seek to
max
e≥0
U(e;w, r).
Recalling that
U(e;w, r) = m(w) + ξµ(m(w)−m(r)) + b(e)− c(e) + ζeµ(m(w)−m(r)),
and from (3) that µ(m(w)−m(r)) is piecewise-linear, we denote by e˜(w, r, λ) the utility-
maximizing effort, which satisfies the first-order condition
Ω(e, w, r, λ) ≡ b′(e)− c′(e) + ζµ(m(w)−m(r)) ≤ 0, (4)
in which the inequality is replaced with an equality if e > 0.10
The following theorem defines the properties of the worker’s optimal effort function,
which exhibits ‘asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity’.
Theorem 1. The worker’s optimal productive effort function takes the form
e˜(w, r, λ) =

e˜(w, r)+ if w > r
e˜n if w = r
e˜(w, r, λ)− if w < r
(5)
10The second-order sufficient condition is b′′(e)− c′′(e) < 0, which is satisfied under assumption W2.
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where e˜n is ‘normal’ effort given by the solution to b
′(e) = c′(e); e˜(w, r)+(> e˜n) is implicitly
defined by b′(e) + ζη(m(w)−m(r)) = c′(e); and e˜(w, r, λ)−(< e˜n) is implicitly defined by
b′(e) ≤ c′(e)+ |ζλη(m(w)−m(r))| (with equality if e > 0, which is true for all w > w(r, λ),
defined in the proof).
For a given r, the optimal effort e˜(w, r, λ) is a continuous function of w with e˜w(w, r, λ) >
0 and e˜ww(w, r, λ) < 0 for all w 6= r. Moreover,11
lim
→0
e˜w(r − , r, λ)− = λ · lim
→0
e˜w(r + , r)+,
so the effort function has a kink at w = r if λ > 1. For a given w, the optimal effort
e˜(w, r, λ) is a continuous function of r with e˜r(w, r, λ) < 0 for all w 6= r. Finally, whilst
optimal effort above the reference wage is independent of λ, below the reference wage
e˜λ(w, r, λ)− < 0 and e˜wλ(w, r, λ)− > 0.
Theorem 1 establishes that if a worker is paid their reference wage then they will exert
normal effort, e˜n. We identify a positive relationship between the wage and effort where
the effect on effort from a change in the wage is asymmetric for a loss averse worker due
to a kink in the effort function at the reference wage. This is illustrated in Figure I.
FIGURE I.
The positive relationship between effort and the wage is driven in our model by the
morale function: an increase in the wage gives a higher marginal utility of effort which
consequently results in higher optimal effort. The asymmetric nature of effort responses
has the particular implication that for changes in the wage from an initial wage equal to
the reference wage, the effect of negative reciprocity that results from a reduction in the
wage will be greater than the effect of positive reciprocity resulting from an increase in
the wage. The extent of this ‘asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity’ depends on the
worker’s degree of loss aversion: whilst when the wage exceeds the reference wage optimal
effort is independent of λ, below the reference wage more loss averse workers exert less
effort which decreases faster as the wage gets further from the reference wage. Indeed, if
a worker is not loss averse (λ = 1), reciprocity is symmetric.
11Throughout the paper, where sequences of  are considered over which limits are taken we specify that
{n}∞n=1 ⊂ R+, meaning that where the wage is specified to be r −  and we take the limit as  → 0 we
consider the wage increasing to the reference wage, and likewise when the wage is specified to be r+  and
we take → 0 we consider the wage decreasing to the reference wage.
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The derived effort relationship establishes the model as providing a micro-foundation
for effort functions that exhibit asymmetric reciprocity that are commonly assumed in
the literature, but that are not explicitly modeled.12 This micro-foundation is based on
perceptions of fairness coupled with loss aversion in the employment relationship, and is
consistent with the evidence that suggests that workers are subject to such forces that was
summarized in Section 2.13
3.3 The firm’s wage setting rule
Next we consider the firm’s problem in setting the wage given that it deduces the behavior
of the worker in response to the wage offer. Suppose a firm is facing a worker who has an
exogenously-given reference wage r and for whom the match productivity is q. The firm
will seek to maximize its payoff given in (1) where the worker’s effort is determined as in
(5). As such, the firm’s problem is to
max
w≥0
pi(w; q, e˜(w, r, λ))
where pi(w; q, e) = y(q, e)−s(w). The firm will continue the employment relationship with
the worker at the optimal wage if it is profitable to do so (which, as noted, we assume the
worker will accept), otherwise the employment relationship will be terminated.
The firm’s output depends on the match productivity and on the effort of the worker,
and the firm seeks to balance the marginal product of labor with the per-worker marginal
cost. Consider two workers with differing match productivity that are otherwise identical
(and in particular have the same reference wage). Conventional thinking implies that the
worker with the lower productivity should be paid a lower wage. The model outlined
here captures the idea that if the firm paid the worker its preferred wage for a given
match productivity and this falls below the worker’s reference wage, the worker’s morale
may be affected that will impact their effort and therefore the output produced from the
employment relationship. This implies a cost of reducing the wage below the reference
wage borne from the effect of negative reciprocity which may be large if the worker is
12For example, our model is consistent with the reduced-form effort function assumed by Elsby [2009]
(except that normal effort depends on the wage which, as discussed, we have chosen not to model), and
with the reduced-form reference-dependent output function assumed by Eliaz and Spiegler [2013]. It is
also consistent with the assumed effort function of Akerlof [1982] in his gift exchange model (when w > r)
and the fair wage-effort hypothesis of Akerlof and Yellen [1990] (when w < r).
13The idea that loss aversion gives rise to asymmetric reciprocity in the effort relationship is consistent
with the intuition presented in, for example, Campbell and Kamlani [1997], Mas [2006], Bewley [2007] and
Fehr et al. [2009].
14
loss averse, and must be considered in relation to the benefit of paying the lower wage:
asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity on the part of workers influences the marginal
considerations of the firm.
We showed in Theorem 1 that the worker’s optimal effort function e˜(w, r, λ) is contin-
uous in the wage, but that there is a kink at w = r for a loss averse worker. The firm’s
payoff function, being otherwise smooth, will inherit this property. The fact that the profit
function is continuous but has a kink at w = r allows us to derive the optimal wage setting
rule, that we explain intuitively below before formally presenting it in Theorem 2. For
w 6= r define the marginal profit as
Ψ(w; q, r, λ) =
dpi(w; q; e˜(w, r, λ))
dw
= ye(q, e˜(w, r, λ))e˜w(w, r, λ)− s′(w),
and note that the profit function is concave14. Subject to the optimal wage contract being
profitable, the optimal wage setting rule is characterized by two productivity thresholds,
ql and qu. The upper threshold qu is derived such that if q > qu then profit is increasing
in the wage at wages just above the reference wage so concavity implies the optimal wage
must exceed r and will be characterized by Ψ(w; q, r, λ) = 0 (in which e˜(w, r, λ) = e˜(w, r)+
since w > r). The lower threshold ql is derived such that if q < ql then profit is decreasing
in the wage for wages just smaller than the reference wage, which by concavity implies
the optimal wage will be below r and will be characterized by Ψ(w; q, r, λ) = 0 (in which
e˜(w, r, λ) = e˜(w, r, λ)− since w < r). For ql ≤ q ≤ qu it will be the case that for all
wages below the reference wage Ψ(w; q, r, λ) > 0 and for all wages above the reference
wage Ψ(w; q, r, λ) < 0, and therefore profit will be maximized with a wage equal to the
reference wage: any worker whose reference wage is r and whose productivity lies in this
range will be paid the same wage, giving rise to what we call a ‘range of rigidity’. If the
optimal wage contract is unprofitable, which will be the case if the match productivity
falls below a threshold that is influenced by the reference wage, the firm will end the
employment relationship.15
Theorem 2. The firm’s optimal wage w˜(r, q, λ) is a continuous function of q and r and
14This is established by noting that profit is continuous, and for w 6= r, Ψw(w; q, r, λ) =
yee(q, e˜(w, r))e˜w(w, r)2+ye(q, e˜(w, r))e˜ww(w, r)−s′′(w) < 0 under Assumptions F1 and F2 and the results
of Theorem 1.
15In the Appendix following the proof of Theorem 2 we explore the implications of the support of the
distribution of match productivity being [q, q¯], where conceivably a worker may have a reference wage such
that the firm may wish to pay below the reference wage no matter how large the match productivity, or
always pay above the reference wage no matter how small the match productivity.
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is characterized by
w˜(r, q, λ) =

w˜(r, q)+ if q > qu(r)
r if ql(r, λ) ≤ q ≤ qu(r)
w˜(r, q, λ)− if q < ql(r, λ),
so long as q ≥ q˜(r, λ), the firm’s reservation productivity, where
ql(r, λ) = {q : lim
→0
Ψ(r − ; q, r, λ) = 0},
qu(r) = {q : lim
→0
Ψ(r + ; q, r, λ) = 0}, and
q˜(r, λ) = max{0, q : pi(w˜(r, q, λ); q, e˜(w˜(r, q, λ), r, λ)) = 0}
(all singletons).
w˜(r, q)+ (> r) is the solution to Ψ(w; q, r, λ) = 0 in which e˜(w, r, λ) = e˜(w, r)+, and
w˜(r, q, λ)− (< r) is the solution to Ψ(w; q, r, λ) ≤ 0, with equality if w > w(r, λ), in
which e˜(w, r, λ) = e˜(w, r, λ)−. w˜q(r, q, λ) > 0 for all q ∈ [q˜(r, λ),∞] \ [ql(r, λ), qu(r)];
w˜r(r, q, λ) > 0 for all q˜(r, λ) ≤ q ≤ ∞; and w˜λ(r, q, λ)− > 0 for all q˜(r, λ) ≤ q < ql(r, λ)
(if this range is non-empty).
The productivity thresholds defining the wage setting rule satisfy
a) ql(r, 1) = qu(r) and q
λ
l (r, λ) < 0 implying ql(r, λ) < qu(r) for all λ > 1; and
b) q′u(r) > 0 and qrl (r, λ) > 0,
and the reservation productivity has the properties that q˜r(r, λ) > 0 and q˜λ(r, λ) ≥ 0, where
the final inequality is strict if w˜(r, q˜(r, λ), λ) < r.
FIGURE II.
Theorem 2 elucidates the features of the firm’s optimal wage setting rule when facing
a loss averse worker, which is illustrated in Figure II. The optimal wage is non-decreasing
in the match productivity and if the worker is loss averse there is a range of match
productivity within which the wage is not adjusted. The lower and upper thresholds of this
range depend on the worker’s reference wage. If the match productivity is qu(r) the worker
will be paid their reference wage which is perceived to be fair and so will exert normal
effort. If the match productivity exceeds qu(r) then the firm will find it profitable to pay
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above the reference wage since such a wage, seen as a gift, will be positively reciprocated
with higher than normal effort which is valuable from these relatively productive workers.
If the match productivity is slightly less than qu(r) the firm would look to reduce the
wage, but understands that paying a wage below the reference wage will be seen as unfair
and generate a reduction in effort, the value of which exceeds the wage cut despite the
relatively low match productivity. This is true for all q ∈ [ql(r, λ), qu(r)], identifying the
range of rigidity which is non-empty if the worker is loss averse. If the match productivity
is below ql(r, λ) then the very low match productivity warrants a wage below the reference
wage despite the negative impact on effort this will have through the worker perceiving
this wage as unfair.
The nature of the wage setting rule hints at wage rigidity not only between workers
that have different match productivity but that are otherwise identical, but also for a
worker over time. Consider a simple dynamic framework in which a worker’s reference
wage remains the same between periods. Then the worker may be paid the same wage
in consecutive periods despite a reduction in the match productivity as the firm seeks to
avoid inciting negative reciprocity that would come from cutting the wage in response to
a lower match productivity. We further explore a dynamic version of the model in the
sequel.
If a worker has a greater degree of loss aversion then the effect of negative reciprocity
borne from paying a wage below the reference wage is stronger, resulting in a greater
reduction in effort which is more costly to the firm. As such, for a more loss averse
worker, the lower threshold of the range of rigidity is lower since the firm is unwilling
to suffer the relatively high cost of negative reciprocity even if the match productivity is
relatively low: qλl (r, λ) < 0. If the match productivity is low enough that the firm wishes
to pay a wage below the reference wage, that wage will be higher the more loss averse
a worker is as the firm has an incentive to attenuate some of the effect on effort from
stronger reciprocity: w˜λ(r, q, λ)− > 0.16 Negative reciprocity not only tempers the firm’s
incentive to cut the wage, it also reduces the extent to which the wage is cut. Finally,
the more loss averse a worker is, the higher the match productivity the firm requires from
the employment relationship for it to be profitable: q˜λ(r, λ) > 0. This follows since the
firm pays a higher wage in an attempt to mitigate the effect of negative reciprocity on
16This implication has been theoretically derived and empirically corroborated by Holden and Wulfsberg
[2014], who show that “even if the wage is cut, the resulting wage will be higher than if the wage-setting
process had been completely flexible”. In contrast with their theoretical model, our theory attributes this
result to the worker’s extent of negative reciprocity.
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effort but optimally doesn’t fully mitigate it leading to lower effort from the worker and
reduced profit; hence the reservation productivity above which the firm becomes profitable
increases.
The effect of a worker feeling entitled to a higher wage (i.e. a higher reference wage)
increases the optimal wage offered by the firm and increases both the threshold above
which the wage is higher than the reference wage, and the threshold below which the
wage is less than the reference wage. In addition, since for any match productivity the
firm receives lower profit, the range of match productivity over which the employment
relationship continues shrinks.
The features of the wage setting rule highlighted in Theorem 2 imply that when a
worker is loss averse a range of rigidity exists and it is larger for individuals that are more
loss averse. For a worker that is not loss averse (λ = 1) there is no range of rigidity and
the wage responds smoothly to productivity.
4 Dynamic wage setting
We now turn to explore the implications of capturing reciprocity and reference-dependence
in the employment relationship in a dynamic environment that is subject to uncertainty
and, inspired by the literature that suggests reference points are influenced by previous
contractual arrangements, workers adapt their reference wage to the wage they have been
paid in the past.17
The timing of the model is as follows (we augment our notation in an obvious way with
time subscripts). At time 0 the productivity characterizing the match, q0, is observed,
as is the exogenously given reference wage of the worker, r0. Knowing these, the firm
then decides whether to offer a wage contract to the worker and start the employment
relationship. For simplicity we assume that any offer is accepted by the worker. If an
employment relationship is established, then at the end of the first employment period the
match productivity for the subsequent period, q1 (which is independent of q0), is randomly
17According to Kahneman et al. [1986] when workers enter a firm there is a shift in their feelings of
entitlement and the most recent negotiated wage is adopted as the standard of fairness. This sort of
adaptation is believed to be an active behavioral feature of workers’ perceptions of fairness, supported by
the anthropological evidence surveyed by Bewley [2007] and by laboratory and field experiments of the
employment relationship (see, for instance, Chemin and Kurmann [2012] and Koch [2014]). In contract
theory the idea of “contracts as reference points” has been analyzed by Hart and Moore [2008] and further
explored by Herweg and Schmidt [2015]. The laboratory experiments of Fehr et al. [2011, 2014] and
Bartling and Schmidt [2015] provide strong support for this assumption, which also reflects the idea that
past experience and adaptation play a significant role in the process of individuals’ reference point formation
(see Herz and Taubinsky [2014] and Smith [2015] for evidence of this hypothesis, and Stommel [2013] for
a review of the literature).
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re-drawn from the same distribution F . In addition, the worker adapts their reference wage
to the wage paid in the initial period of employment. After observing q1, and inferring
the worker’s new reference wage r1 = w˜0, the firm considers whether it wants to continue
the employment relationship and, if so, whether to adjust the wage of the worker in light
of the change in the match productivity. The timing of the employment relationship is
illustrated in Figure III.
FIGURE III.
The firm therefore faces a two-period dynamic stochastic optimization problem in
which it seeks to maximize the sum of its expected discounted profits from the employment
relationship. Letting δ represent the firm’s discount factor, this is characterized by
J0(r0, q0) = max
w0
pi(w0; q0, e0) + δE0[J1(r1, q1)]
s.t. r1 = w0 and
et = e˜(wt, rt, λ),
where J1(r1, q1) = max
w1
pi(w1; q1, e1)
(6)
which is solved recursively. Whilst we consider that the firm is forward looking, absent
a link between the initial and the subsequent employment period, the worker will choose
productive effort to maximise their per-period utility, in accordance with the derivation
of optimal productive effort in Theorem 1.18
The analysis that follows is divided in two parts: first we consider the case of a myopic
firm (δ = 0) that ignores the link between the two employment periods, where we highlight
that wage rigidity, both downward and upward, may occur as a result of workers being
loss averse. Then we consider a farsighted firm (δ > 0) where we characterize the optimal
employment contract that solves the dynamic problem in (6), and explore its properties.
4.1 Myopic firm
If the firm is myopic then, ignoring the fact that the wage becomes the worker’s subsequent
reference wage, it will set the wage in each employment period to maximize the per-period
profit given the state of the employment relationship (the match productivity and the
18Forward-looking behavior could be incorporated with expectations-based reference points, as in Ko˝szegi
and Rabin [2006]. However, the evidence previously cited strongly suggests that workers’ reference wages
are backward looking, as in our model.
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worker’s reference wage). As such, the firm will adopt the standard wage setting rule as
derived in Theorem 2, so in each period t = 0, 1 the optimal wage takes the form
w˜t = w˜(rt, qt, λ) =

w˜(rt, qt)
+ if qt > qu(rt)
rt if ql(rt, λ) ≤ qt ≤ qu(rt)
w˜(rt, qt, λ)
− if qt < ql(rt, λ)
so long as qt ≥ q˜(rt, λ), otherwise the firm will not offer, or renegotiate, the employment
contract and the employment relationship will be over.
To illustrate the dynamics of wage setting behavior for a myopic firm, we now consider
different scenarios the firm may face during the employment relationship assuming that in
both the initial and subsequent employment periods the match productivity exceeds the
firm’s reservation productivity q˜(r0, λ) and q˜(r1, λ) respectively, reserving commentary on
when this is not the case as a postscript.
FIGURE IV.
Suppose that, in the initial employment period, q0 > qu(r0) so the firm offers a wage
that exceeds the reference wage to appeal to the worker’s positive reciprocity: w˜0 =
w˜(r0, q0)
+ and the worker will exert supra-normal effort. As the employment relationship
passes from the initial period into the subsequent period, the worker adjusts their feelings
of entitlement, adapting their reference wage to their initial wage: r1 = w˜0. This ‘shifts’
the wage-setting rule, as illustrated in Figure IV: the reference wage increases, the lower
threshold increases, and the upper threshold increases to somewhere between its previous
value and the initial match productivity. If the production function exhibits constant
returns to effort, qu(w˜0) increases to exactly q0.
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If q1 > q0(≥ qu(w˜0)) then the match productivity in the subsequent employment period
exceeds the upper threshold of the wage setting rule and the firm will increase the worker’s
wage to benefit from the gift being reciprocated with supra-normal effort. If q1 = q0 then
w˜1 ≥ w˜0: whilst a wage of w˜0 was positively reciprocated by the worker when compared
19In Theorem 2 we demonstrated that qrl > 0 and q
′
u > 0. Recall that qu(r) is the value of q where
lim→0 Ψ(r + ; q, r, λ) = 0. If w˜0 = w˜+ then the first-order condition is satisfied with equality at the
optimal wage in the initial contract: Ψ(w˜0; q0, r0, λ) = 0. Recall (from the preliminaries in the proof of
Theorem 2) that Ψr = yeee˜r e˜w ≥ 0. Then, in the subsequent period where the worker’s reference wage
increases to w˜0, we find that lim→0 Ψ(w˜0 + ; q0, w˜0, λ) ≥ 0, and therefore, since Ψq > 0, the value of q
that regains equality of this expression with 0, which is precisely qu(w˜0), will not exceed q0. If y
ee = 0
then Ψr = 0 and lim→0 Ψ(w˜0 + ; q0, w˜0, λ) = 0 so qu(w˜0) = q0.
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to a reference wage of r0, with the worker’s updated sense of entitlement effort with this
wage will be merely normal—positive reciprocity is a temporary phenomenon when the
worker adapts their reference wage20— and so the firm optimally pays at least this wage
in the subsequent contract.
If q1 < q0 then the employment renegotiation depends on by how much the match
productivity reduces: only if q1 < ql(w˜0, λ) will the firm implement a wage cut, by reducing
the wage below wage paid in the initial employment period. Indeed, reductions in the
match productivity may be associated with an increase in the wage (if they are small and
in the range [qu(w˜0), q0], which is non-empty only with decreasing returns to effort). As
such, a fall in match productivity over time (q1 < q0) is not necessarily followed by a
wage cut: the worker’s adaptation to a wage consistent with a match productivity of q0
implies that, if the match productivity only moderately decreases, the firm will keep the
wage equal to the worker’s reference wage. The negative effect of what is now perceived
as an unfair wage, borne through negative reciprocity, will be larger than the benefit of
paying the lower wage and hence the firm will avoid inciting such negative reciprocity and
will freeze the wage. Downward wage rigidity is an inherent feature of the employment
contract in a dynamic environment, the key features that drive which are the worker’s
adaptation of the reference wage (r1 = w˜0), and the relatively large cost to the firm of
negative reciprocity that derives from loss aversion (λ > 1).
In the case where the initial match productivity is such that q0 < ql(r0, λ) the firm
will pay an initial wage below the worker’s reference wage, despite the implied negative
reciprocity. In the following period, the worker’s reference wage reduces to the initial
wage level,21 and the firm’s wage setting rule adjusts accordingly. In this case, the lower
threshold of the range of rigidity reduces to somewhere between q0 and ql(w˜0, λ) with
the implication that the employment relationship will exhibit upward wage rigidity if the
subsequent match productivity increases but is less than qu(w˜0, λ), since within this range
the firm will pay a wage no higher than in the initial employment period. The intuition
is that in the initial employment period the firm essentially ‘over-paid’ the worker in an
optimal trade-off of wage vs negative reciprocity; in the subsequent period the firm will
20This implication of the model is consistent with the evidence reported by field research (experiments
and surveys) that the positive effects of a wage gift on morale and effort are believed to be weak and only
temporary by firms’ managers. It also supports the interpretation of this evidence according to which
positive reciprocity quickly disappears as workers get used to the wage they receive (see, for instance,
Campbell and Kamlani [1997], Bewley [1999], Gneezy and List [2006] and Cohn et al. [2014]).
21Hence, adaptation is symmetric. In the discussion section we consider the implications of asymmetric
adaptation of the reference wage.
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pay the same wage even if the match is more productive, and will only increase the wage if
the match becomes substantially more productive and the benefits of positive reciprocity
warrant a wage rise.
FIGURE V.
Finally, if, in the initial employment period the match productivity is such that
ql(r0, λ) ≤ q0 ≤ qu(r0) then the worker will be paid their reference wage, which conse-
quently does not change between periods. As such, the wage setting rule in the subsequent
employment period is exactly the same as in the initial period, implying that there may
be both downward and upward wage rigidity if the subsequent productivity draw is such
that ql(r0, λ) ≤ q1 ≤ qu(r0).
Consider the evolution of the firm’s reservation productivity between periods; the
initial determining hiring behavior, and the subsequent capturing the firm’s layoff decision.
If q0 < q˜(r0, λ) then no contract is offered. Otherwise a contract is offered and, since the
initial wage becomes the subsequent reference wage, when the firm comes to renegotiate
the contract the reservation productivity will depend on the initial wage. We deduced
in Theorem 2 that q˜r(r, λ) > 0. This implies, in particular, that if the firm has initially
paid a wage that exceeds the worker’s reference wage, then in the subsequent period
the firm’s reservation productivity increases, implying the firm will re-contract only over
a reduced subset of the support of the match productivity distribution. As such, it is
not inconceivable for an employment relationship to be characterized by the same match
productivity in both periods but, whilst the worker is hired and paid a wage above their
reference wage in the initial period, in the subsequent period the firm doesn’t renegotiate
the contract.
Due to workers’ loss aversion and adaptation of the reference wage, the value of the
subsequent period employment contract is lower if a worker was initially paid a wage in
excess of their reference wage. This implies that if a worker is paid a higher initial wage
contract, there is a higher probability that the subsequent period match productivity will
not be high enough to make the relationship profitable, increasing the likelihood of the
worker being laid off. We further consider the implications of our model for layoff decisions
and unemployment in Section 5.
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4.2 Farsighted firm
If a firm is farsighted it will consider the link between the initial and the subsequent
wage negotiation that comes from the worker’s adaptation of their reference wage during
the employment period to the wage in the initial contract. This influences the worker’s
future effort response as it is relative to the reference wage r1 = w˜0 that subsequent wage
offers will be evaluated, which in turn influences the value of the continuing employment
relationship for the firm.
Since r1 = w0, the optimization problem for a farsighted firm when setting the initial
wage contract is
max
w0
pi0(w0; q0, e˜(w0, r0, λ)) + δE0[J1(w0, q1)]. (7)
The expected value of future profit E0[J1(w0, q1)] =
∫∞
q˜(w0,λ) J1(w0, q1)dF (q1) now also de-
pends on the initial wage. Recognizing that the reservation productivity for this contract,
below which the firm would lay off the worker, may fall anywhere in the support of the
distribution of match productivity, this can be expressed as22
E0[J1(w0, q1)] =
∫ max{q˜(w0,λ),ql(w0,λ)}
q˜(w0,λ)
J1(w0, q1)
−dF (q1)
+
∫ max{q˜(w0,λ),qu(w0)}
max{q˜(w0,λ),ql(w0,λ)}
J1(w0, q1)
=dF (q1) +
∫ ∞
max{q˜(w0,λ),qu(w0)}
J1(w0, q1)
+dF (q1).
(8)
This expression highlights that the firm faces different realizations of future profit when
setting the initial wage contract w0, depending on whether the subsequent match produc-
tivity q1 is below, within or above the range of rigidity defined by ql(w0, λ) and qu(w0).
Attentive observation of equation (8) allows us to infer two important insights: when
setting the wage in the initial employment period the firm influences: i) the level of the
expected value of future profit J1(w0, q1); and ii) the range of the distribution of the future
match productivity within which the firm will subsequently cut or freeze the wage at time
1, and lay off the worker by ceasing an unprofitable match.
Let θ(w0, λ) be the marginal effect of a wage increase in the initial wage contract on
the expected profit in period 1, then we have the following result.
Proposition 1.
θ(w0, λ) ≡ d
dw0
∫ ∞
q˜(w0,λ) J1(w0, q1)dF (q1) < 0.
22J1(w0, q1)
−;=;+ represents the optimized profit when w1 < w0;w1 = w0;w1 > w0, in which effort is
given by e˜(w1, w0, λ)
−; e˜n; e˜(w1, w0)+.
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When setting the initial wage contract in a dynamic environment a farsighted firm will
account for an additional expected future cost: a higher initial wage influences the worker’s
feelings of entitlement in the subsequent renegotiation, which consequently influences the
worker’s effort and the value of the contract to the firm. A marginal increase in the initial
wage lowers the expected value of profit because if, relative to the initial wage, the firm
wants to lower the wage then the effect of negative reciprocity is greater; if it wishes to
freeze the wage then the wage paid is simply higher; and if it wants to increase the wage
then the effect of positive reciprocity is lower.
We now turn to deduce the optimal wage contract of a farsighted firm, which we denote
w˜0. So long as w˜0 6= r0 the necessary first-order condition that must be satisfied is
Ψ(w0; q0, r0, λ) + δθ(w0, λ) = 0.
As we note in the proof of the following theorem that presents the properties of the optimal
contract, an additional assumption is required to proceed with the analysis which is that
the magnitude of the ‘current direct effect’ of a change in the wage on marginal profit in
the initial contract, |Ψw|, is always larger than the ‘discounted expected future indirect
effect’ on marginal profit that results from the initial wage becoming the reference wage,
captured by δθw0 .23 From this point on we also make two further innocuous assumptions
to ease notational burden.24
Theorem 3. Consider a farsighted firm for whom δ > 0 and assume Ψw + δθw0 < 0.
Then the optimal wage setting rule for the initial employment contract is
w˜0 = wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ) =

wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ)
+ if q0 > qˆu(r0, λ, δ)
r0 if qˆl(r0, λ, δ) ≤ q0 ≤ qˆu(r0, λ, δ)
wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ)
− if q0 < qˆl(r0, λ, δ),
23These effects could work in opposite directions as the sign of the second derivative of the expected
future profit function with respect to the initial wage θw0 remains undetermined. We believe that in our
model current direct effects of wage changes will dominate the expected future indirect effects through the
influence of the initial wage on the reference wage, but nevertheless note that the concavity of Ψ established
in Theorem 2 implies the assumed inequality will hold if the firm is sufficiently impatient.
24These are: 1) any contract offered by a firm is not constrained by the lower bound on effort, i.e. the
wage always exceeds w(r, λ), which implies that unless the optimal wage is equal to the reference wage the
firm’s first-order condition is satisfied with equality; and 2) in the second employment period the firm’s
reservation productivity q˜(w0, λ), which determines layoffs, is always less than the lower threshold of therange of rigidity ql(w0, λ).
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so long as q0 ≥ qˆ˜(r0, λ, δ), where
qˆl(r0, λ, δ) = {q0 : lim
→0
Ψ(r0 − ; q0, r0, λ) + δθ(r0, λ) = 0},
qˆu(r0, λ, δ) = {q0 : lim
→0
Ψ(r0 + ; q0, r0, λ) + δθ(r0, λ) = 0} and
qˆ˜(r0, λ, δ) = max{0, q0 : J0(r0, q0) = 0}.
qˆ˜(r0, λ, δ) is the reservation productivity that governs hiring: if q0 < qˆ˜(r0, λ, δ) no contract
is offered to the worker.
The optimal wage wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ)
+ (> r0) is the solution to Ψ(w0; q0, r0, λ)+δθ(w0, λ) =
0 in which Ψ is evaluated using e˜(w0, r0)
+, and wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ)
− (< r0) is the solution to
Ψ(w0; q0, r0, λ) + δθ(w0, λ) = 0, in which Ψ is evaluated using e˜(w0, r0, λ)
−.
For all q0 ∈ [qˆ˜(r0, λ, δ),∞]\[qˆl(r0, λ, δ), qˆu(r0, λ, δ)], wˆq0(r0, q0, λ, δ) > 0 and wˆr0(r0, q0, λ, δ) >
0.
What is the effect of the link between the initial wage and the subsequent reference
wage on a firm’s wage setting behavior? Intuitively, since a farsighted firm perceives a
future cost of raising the current wage due to a higher future reference wage and a higher
probability of being in a situation to enact a costly wage cut/freeze, they will set a lower
initial wage compared to a myopic firm in an otherwise identical employment relationship.
The following proposition clarifies.
Proposition 2. Consider a firm for whom δ > 0 and Ψw + δθw0 < 0 that faces a loss
averse worker. Then wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ) ≤ w˜(r0, q0, λ), with a strict inequality whenever the
wage is not equal to the reference wage r0.
Proposition 2 concludes that if a firm is farsighted it will have an incentive to compress
the initial wage contract for a newly hired worker if downward wage rigidity may be a
feature of the following employment period.25 Wage compression is thus a general result
of our theory of wage setting behavior.26
We now turn to investigate the effect of loss aversion on the nature of the dynamic
employment contract, by considering its effects on the initial wage contract wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ)
25Indeed, implicit differentiation of the wage setting rule reveals
wˆδ = − θ
Ψw + δθw0
< 0,
so the more a firm cares about the future the lower will be the initial wage offered.
26Elsby [2009] obtains a similar result in an infinite-horizon dynamic model for an ongoing employment
relationship when downward wage rigidity binds; he also provides empirical evidence of this result, which
is further corroborated by Stu¨ber and Beissinger [2012]. Our theory is consistent with these findings and
provides a framework that elucidates the behavioral forces at play.
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and on the firm’s hiring reservation productivity qˆ˜(r0, λ, δ), and its layoff reservation pro-
ductivity q˜(w˜0, λ). Recall that the worker’s degree of loss aversion influences the strength
of negative reciprocity if the firm finds itself in a position where it optimally pays a wage
below the worker’s reference wage; therefore, the cost of enacting wage cuts is directly
related to the degree of loss aversion, which has an effect in both employment periods.
For a more loss averse worker the firm has a stronger incentive to reduce the gap
between the wage paid and the reference wage, to attenuate the stronger effects of negative
reciprocity whenever w˜0 < r0. In the initial employment period where the reference wage
is fixed, this puts upward pressure on the wage if the firm faces a worker whom they would
want to pay below their reference wage. However, the fact that this initial wage becomes
the reference wage in the subsequent employment period puts downward pressure on the
initial wage because the expected effect of negative reciprocity is larger for a more loss
averse worker, and a lower reference wage reduces the magnitude of this effect.27
If the firm is considering an employment contract that is characterized by a sufficiently
high initial match productivity such that the firm optimally pays at least the reference
wage (i.e. q0 ≥ qˆl), then there is no current direct effect of loss aversion and the expected
future cost of increased negative reciprocity means the firm will pay a worker with a higher
degree of loss aversion a lower initial wage. If the firm is facing an employment relationship
with an initial match productivity such that the optimal contract in the initial period calls
for a wage below the reference wage (if q0 < qˆl), the overall effect of a higher degree of loss
aversion depends on the balance of the two effects, and how much the firm cares about
the future cost of negative reciprocity. If the current effect dominates the expected future
effect, then the initial wage will be higher for a more loss averse worker; if it doesn’t and
the firm is not too impatient then the initial wage will be lower for a more loss averse
worker.28
We now discuss the effect of loss aversion on the determination of the firm’s reservation
productivity governing both hiring and layoff decisions. For hiring decisions, this depends
on how loss aversion influences the firm’s current and expected future profit, whilst for
27The conclusion that θλ < 0 is subject to the qualification that the firm’s lay-off reservation productivity
doesn’t increase too much with the degree of loss aversion: as we showed in Theorem 2 the firm’s reservation
productivity in the final period is increasing in the worker’s degree of loss aversion so a more loss averse
worker is more likely to be laid off which reduces the probability of the firm having to enact a wage cut,
partially offsetting the increased expected cost of doing so.
28We deduced in Theorem 1 that e˜wλ− > 0, so the negative effect of loss aversion on effort is stronger
for wages just below the reference wage than when substantial reductions below the reference wage are
considered. As such, the current effect will be larger the closer is the match productivity to the lower
threshold qˆl.
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layoff decisions it only depends on the profit in the subsequent employment contract. Loss
aversion influences profit in two ways. First, there is a direct negative effect on effort if
the wage is below the reference wage which acts to reduce profit and is present in both
the initial and subsequent employment periods. Second, there is an indirect effect in the
subsequent employment period that comes from the firm changing the initial wage that
becomes the reference wage: if the initial wage increases this provides a compounding
negative effect on effort in the subsequent contract if the wage is below the reference wage
which lowers profit; whilst if the initial wage reduces there is an at least partially offsetting
positive effect on effort which increases profit.
In the subsequent employment period, profit is influenced by both the direct and
indirect effects described above. Consequently, the reservation productivity governing
layoff decisions will increase either if the initial wage is higher (which lowers profit), or the
negative direct effect dominates the positive indirect effect when the initial wage is lower.
In the initial employment period the firm accounts for the current direct effect of more
loss aversion (which reduces profit), and the expected future direct and indirect effects
discussed in the previous paragraph. We show in the following proposition that increased
loss aversion unambiguously increases the hiring reservation productivity, where we also
summarize the other effects of loss aversion discussed above.
Proposition 3. Consider a firm for whom δ > 0 and Ψw + δθw0 ≤ 0, and suppose that
q˜λ is sufficiently small. Then θλ(w0, λ) < 0 and for λ′ > λ,
wˆ(r0, q0, λ
′, δ) ≷ wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ)⇔ Ψλ + δθλ ≷ 0.
In addition,
a) qˆ˜(r0, λ′, δ) > qˆ˜(r0, λ, δ); and
b) q˜(wˆ, λ′) > q˜(wˆ, λ) if either the wage in the initial contract increases, or the direct effect
of loss aversion on effort exceeds the indirect effect.
Proposition 3 highlights some ambiguity in how the firm will change its behavior when
faced with a more loss averse worker, which is natural in this dynamic environment given
the opposing effects when the wage becomes the subsequent reference wage. However,
we conjecture that the current effect of loss aversion dominates the discounted expected
future effect,29 and that in the subsequent contract the direct effect of loss aversion on
29This will hold for sufficiently impatient firms, but we believe it has intuitive merit.
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effort is larger than any indirect effect that comes through a change in the reference wage.
If our conjecture is correct we can draw unambiguous conclusions: if q0 ≥ qˆl then (even
without our conjecture) the firm will set a lower initial wage; if q0 < qˆl the firm will set a
higher initial wage; and both the hiring reservation productivity and the layoff reservation
productivity increase: a greater degree of loss aversion leads to compression of wages above
reference wages, as well as compression in hiring.
5 Discussion
The Role of the Reference Wage. One of the key features of our dynamic analysis is the
assumption defining the worker’s adaptation of the reference wage, r1 = w˜0. Although
being consistent with a large body of evidence in the literature, this assumption abstracts
from several other aspects of workers’ reference wage formation: i) adaptation may not
be symmetric; and ii) workers’ perceptions of fairness at each negotiation date, namely r0
and r1, may be influenced by more than just past wages.
We have so far assumed that adaptation to the reference wage is symmetric, which
implies both positive and negative reciprocity are only temporary phenomena. There is
evidence to suggest that negative reciprocity is not only stronger as our theory predicts,
but also more persistent than positive reciprocity. We could easily capture this in our
model with an asymmetric adaptation rule where workers adapt more readily to wage
rises than to wage cuts,30 for example
r1(w˜0, r0) =
 w˜0 if w˜0 > r0r0 if w˜0 ≤ r0.
With this specification the worker’s positive reciprocity will only last one employment
period if the wage is perceived as a gift at time 0, while if a wage contract is perceived
as unfair there will be no adaptation of the reference wage and the same wage in the
subsequent employment contract would be equally negatively reciprocated. Asymmetric
adaptation will exacerbate the firm’s cost of negative reciprocity when facing a loss averse
worker, which reinforces the predictions established in Section 4.
We could also consider alternative formulations of the worker’s reference wage that
may differ depending on whether the worker is a new hire (at time 0) or an incumbent (at
30This hypothesis is supported by the experimental evidence on reference point adaptation provided by
Arkes et al. [2008, 2010]: individuals (in our case workers) adapt more rapidly to gains (gifts) than to
losses (unfair wages).
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time 1). For instance a newly hired worker’s reference wage r0 could be influenced by the
state of the labor market (as in Akerlof [1982] and Summers [1988]), the most recent wage
contract paid in the previous employment relationship (as Koenig et al. [2014] suggest),
or the wage of incumbent workers employed by the same firm (as explored by Snell and
Thomas [2010]). On the other hand an employed worker’s reference wage r1 might be
influenced by the wage of his peers outside the firm (as in Keynes [1936], Bhaskar [1990]
or Driscoll and Holden [2004]), by expectations (as in Eliaz and Spiegler [2013]) or by
the firm’s ability to pay (as in Danthine and Kurmann [2007]).For example, if a worker
considers the firm’s ability to pay, they may revise their perceptions of fairness accordingly
and accept a lower wage in periods of adverse economic conditions, without loss of morale
and negative reciprocity. This insight could shed some new light on the importance of
information disclosure by firms, and its influence on workers’ perceptions of fairness as
discussed by Kahneman et al. [1986] and Bewley [1999].
Our model, being derived from first principles and being transparent in the link between
assumptions and conclusions, provides a tractable framework within which to consider
these issues and understand their relevance in employment relationships.
History Dependence, Wage Dynamics, Hiring and Lay Offs. The dynamic analysis of
Section 4 highlights two additional important insights of our theory that can be informative
to ongoing theoretical and empirical research concerned with labour market fluctuations.
Both insights are driven by the worker’s adaptation of the reference wage — which carries
the information contained in the wage contract wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ) from the initial employment
period into the subsequent one — and by the worker’s asymmetric reference-dependent
reciprocity.
First, the model reveals that the initial conditions characterizing the state of the econ-
omy when a new employment contract is offered (captured by the information contained
in the two state variables r0 and q0) persist into the employment relationship and influ-
ence the subsequent wage setting and layoff decisions of the firm. For instance, a worker
that receives a higher initial wage contract due to favourable economic conditions (high
q0) is more likely to be paid a higher wage in the subsequent period than an otherwise
identical worker hired at a lower match productivity. Moreover, all else equal, the worker
employed at a higher wage also faces a greater ex-ante probability of being laid off. This
insight generates implications for labour market models that endogenize workers’ job de-
struction rate through the derivation of a layoff reservation productivity similar to q˜(r1, λ)
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(e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides [1994], and most recently Eliaz and Spiegler [2013]). It
also has implications for the empirical research that attempts to capture the persistent
effects of labour market conditions at the time of hiring for the subsequent path of work-
ers’ wages during the employment relationship, and on their probability of being laid off
(e.g. Beaudry and DiNardo [1991]; Schmieder and von Wachter [2010]). In our model
this persistency depends on whether information about the state of the labour market is
incorporated in the reference wage by the worker at the time of hiring.
Second, we have shown that the anticipation of the costs related to negative reciprocity
and wage rigidity influence a farsighted firm’s behavior at the time of hiring, putting
upward pressure on the hiring reservation productivity qˆ˜(r0, λ) and downward pressure on
the optimal initial wage contract. This prediction has implications for the understanding
of the effects of wage rigidity for hiring behavior and wage dynamics. In the current
macroeconomic literature concerned with labour market fluctuations, much attention has
been devoted to the effect of wage rigidity of ‘newly hired’ workers on firms’ job creation
incentives (see for instance the discussion in Elsby et al. [2015a] and references therein).
In contrast, in our model what matters for hiring behavior is the expected wage rigidity in
the subsequent employment period once workers are employed. Thus our theory suggests
that wage rigidity matters for job creation to the extent that it negatively influences the
expected discounted value of profit that a firm gets from opening a vacancy and hiring.
6 Conclusion
Inspired by evidence from anthropological and experimental research on labor markets,
in this paper we have advanced a theory of wage setting behavior based on contractual
incompleteness, fairness, reciprocity, and reference dependence and loss aversion in the
evaluation of wage contracts by workers. We identified loss aversion, rather than reci-
procity per se, as the source of wage rigidity, and developed an understanding of the
consequences of this for the wage setting and hiring behavior of firms in a simple dynamic
framework. Our model provides a microeconomic account of many of the explanations of
wage rigidity presented in the literature and, being simple, tractable, and based on first
principles, establishes a clear link between the primitives of workers’ evaluation of wage
offers and the behavior of workers and firms.
Further exploring the insights of the model within a richer macroeconomic framework
is firmly on our future research agenda. We believe that incorporating the asymmetric
30
reference-dependent reciprocity we derived here in a macroeconomic model will act to
suitably suppress the flexibility of wages to variation in economic conditions, that will
convincingly contribute to the ongoing debate in the theory of labor market fluctuations
(e.g. Shimer [2005]). Moreover since our model is clear in the distinction between newly
hired and incumbent workers, it stands as a rich and tractable framework to analyze the
consequences of the expected cost of wage rigidity in long-term employment relationships
for hiring behavior and wage dynamics; an aspect that drew particular attention in light
of recent cross-country labor market experiences in the aftermath of the Great Recession
[Elsby et al., 2015b]. Therefore, a promising line of future research lies in developing a
more complete understanding of the determinants and evolution of the reference wage
for newly hired and incumbent workers, and the consequences for the dynamics of labor
market outcomes, initial investigation of which is proving insightful.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. We suppose Assumptions W1-W4 hold throughout. When w = r,
m(w) = m(r) and therefore Ω(e, w, r, λ) = b′(e) − c′(e). By assumption, Ω(0, r, r, λ) > 0
and Ωe(e, w, r, λ) < 0, which implies e˜(r, r, λ) ≡ e˜n > 0. Recalling the definition of µ(·) in
(3), when w > r, Ω(e, w, r, λ) = b′(e) − c′(e) + ζη(m(w) −m(r)) with m(w) −m(r) > 0.
As such Ω(e˜n, w, r, λ) > Ω(e˜n, r, r, λ) and then the fact that Ωe(e, w, r, λ) < 0 implies
e˜(w, r)+ > e˜n for all w > r. When w < r, Ω(e, w, r, λ) = b′(e)− c′(e) + ζλη(m(w)−m(r))
with m(w) − m(r) < 0, so Ω(e˜n, w, r, λ) < Ω(e˜n, r, r, λ) so Ωe(e, w, r, λ) < 0 implies
e˜(w, r, λ)− < e˜n.
When w < r, the wage offered may be such that the worker would optimally choose
e < 0 but cannot due to the constraint that e ≥ 0. Define
w(r, λ) = max{0, w : Ω(0, w, r, λ) = 0}.
Since Ωw(e, w, r, λ) > 0 this identifies the threshold wage at which the worker would choose
e = 0 and below which they would like to choose e < 0 (since Ω(e, w, r, λ) < 0 for all e ≥ 0)
but cannot, so we define e˜(w(r, λ), r, λ)− ≡ 0 for all w ≤ w(r, λ).
For w 6= r, continuity of e˜(w, r, λ) is readily established as Ω(e, w, r, λ) is continuous
in all its arguments. Continuity at w = r is established by noting that in the expression
for Ω(e, w, r, λ), lim→0m(r + ) −m(r) = 0 which implies e˜(w, r)+ → e˜n as w → r from
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above, and lim→0m(r − )−m(r) = 0 implying e˜(w, r, λ)− → e˜n as w → r from below.
When w 6= r and w > w(r, λ) implicit differentiation of the first-order condition reveals
e˜w(w, r, λ) = −ζµ
′(m(w)−m(r))m′(w)
b′′(e)− c′′(e) > 0
under our assumptions. Further differentiating this expression (recalling that µ(·) is piece-
wise linear) we find that
e˜ww(w, r, λ) = −ζµ
′(m(w)−m(r))m′′(w)
b′′(e)− c′′(e) < 0,
establishing concavity of the optimal effort function.
Note from (3) that for w > r, µ′(·) = η and when w < r, µ′(·) = λη. To consider the
response of effort to the wage above and below the reference wage we use the continuity
of e˜(w, r, λ) to establish that
lim
→0
e˜w(r − , r, λ)− = − lim
→0
λζηm′(r − )
b′′(e˜(r − , r, λ)−)− c′′(e˜(r − , r, λ)−) = −
λζηm′(r)
b′′(e˜n)− c′′(e˜n)
= −λ lim
→0
ζηm′(r + )
b′′(e˜(r + , r)+)− c′′(e˜(r + , r)+) = λ lim→0 e˜
w(r + , r)+.
Indeed, the fact that effort is increasing in the wage combined with concavity of m(·)
imply that for any w′ < r < w′′ we have
e˜w(w′, r)− = − λζηm
′(w′)
b′′(e˜(w′, r)−)− c′′(e˜(w′, r)−)
> − λζηm
′(w′′)
b′′(e˜(w′′, r)+)− c′′(e˜(w′′, r)+) = λe˜
w(w′′, r)+.
The relationship between e˜(w, r, λ) and r is established by implicit differentiation:
e˜r(w, r, λ) =
ζµ′(m(w)−m(r))m′(r)
b′′(e)− c′′(e) < 0.
Similarly, the effect of the degree of loss aversion on effort when w < r is
e˜λ(w, r, λ)− = −ζη(m(w)−m(r))
b′′(e)− c′′(e) < 0.
Moreover, the effect of the degree of loss aversion on the effort response to the wage (for
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w < r) is
e˜wλ(w, r, λ) = − ζηm
′(w)
b′′(e)− c′′(e) > 0.
Proof of Theorem 2. Throughout the proof we assume the worker’s productivity and ref-
erence wage are such that q ≥ q˜(r, λ) so the firm will be profitable if it hires the worker, and
consider the properties of the threshold productivity at the end. We proceed by first stat-
ing some preliminaries, then considering the productivity thresholds, then demonstrating
the nature of the optimal wage setting rule.
Preliminaries: First, note that under Assumption F2 and the results of Theorem 1, for
w 6= r we have that Ψq(w; q, r, λ) = yqee˜w > 0; Ψr(w; q, r, λ) = yeee˜re˜w + yee˜wr ≥ 0 (after
noting that e˜wr = 0); and Ψw(w; q, r, λ) = yee(e˜w)2 + yee˜ww − s′′(w) < 0. In addition,
Ψλ = yeee˜λe˜w + yee˜wλ so Ψλ > 0 if w < r and Ψλ = 0 if w > r. These results also allow
us to deduce that if λ > 1, Ψ(w; q, r, λ) jumps down at the reference wage, since
lim
→0
Ψ(r − ; q, r, λ)− lim
→0
Ψ(r + ; q, r, λ) =
ye(q, lim
→0
e˜(r − , r, λ)−) lim
→0
e˜w(r − , r, λ)− − s′(r − )−
ye(q, lim
→0
e˜(r + , r)+) lim
→0
e˜w(r + , r)+ − s′(r + )
= ye(q, e˜n)[lim
→0
e˜w(r − , r, λ)− − lim
→0
e˜w(r + , r)+]
= ye(q, e˜n) lim
→0
e˜w(r + , r)+(λ− 1) ≥ 0,
with a strict inequality if λ > 1. As such, Ψ(w; q, r, λ) is everywhere decreasing in w,
establishing concavity of the payoff function.
Productivity thresholds: As will be made clear in the remainder of the proof, the
threshold ql(r, λ) identifies the critical match productivity below which the firm would
want to set the wage below the reference wage, and qu(r) is the match productivity above
which the firm would want to compensate the worker more than the reference wage. The
former is the value of q below which profit is decreasing just below the reference wage; the
latter is the value of q above which profit is increasing just above the reference wage. Since
Ψ(w, 0, r, λ) < 0 when w > 0 and Ψq > 0 there will be a unique value of each productivity
threshold.
We now want to establish some properties of the thresholds. Implicit differentiation
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allows us to deduce that
qrl (r, λ) = − lim
→0
dΨ(r−;q,r,λ)
dr
Ψq(r − ; q, r, λ) and
q′u(r) = − lim
→0
dΨ(r+;q,r,λ)
dr
Ψq(r + ; q, r, λ)
.
Now,
dΨ(r ± ; q, r, λ)
dr
= Ψw(r ± ; q, r, λ) + Ψr(r ± ; q, r, λ)
= yee(e˜w±)2 + yee˜ww± + yeee˜r±e˜w±
= yee(e˜w±)(e˜w± + e˜r±) + yee˜ww±,
As → 0 we can infer that e˜w(r ± , r, λ)± + e˜r(r ± , r, λ)± → 0 (refer to the expressions
of these objects in the proof of Theorem 1), implying lim→0
dΨ(r±;q,r,λ)
dr = y
ee˜ww± < 0.
This allows us to conclude that qrl (r, λ) > 0 and q
′
u(r) > 0.
Turning next to investigate how the lower threshold depends on the degree of loss
aversion, implicit differentiation gives
qλl (r, λ) = − lim
→0
Ψλ(r − , q, r, λ)
Ψq(r − , q, r, λ)
= −y
ee lim→0 e˜λ(r − , r, λ)− lim→0 e˜w(r − , r, λ)− + ye lim→0 e˜wλ(r − , r, λ)−
lim→0 Ψq(r − ; q, r, λ) < 0
since we deduced in Theorem 1 that e˜λ− < 0 and e˜wλ− > 0.
The consideration of lim→0 Ψ(r− ; q, rλ)− lim→0 Ψ(r+ ; q, r, λ) in the preliminaries
allows us to conclude that when λ = 1 these two objects are equal. This, combined with
the observation that lim→0 e˜(r − , r, λ)− = e˜n = lim→0 e˜(r + , r) (from Theorem 1)
permits the conclusion that ql(r, 1) = qu(r). This, along with the fact that q
λ
l (r, λ) < 0
implies ql(r, λ) < qu(r) for all λ > 1.
Optimal wage setting : We now turn to the optimal wage setting rule, which depends
on the match productivity in relation to the productivity thresholds.
If q ∈ [0, ql(r, λ)) then the definition of ql(r, λ) and fact that Ψq > 0 can be used to
deduce that lim→0 Ψ(r − , q, r, λ) < 0; since Ψ(w; q, r, λ) is everywhere decreasing in w,
the same is true for all w ≥ r. As such, the optimizing wage must satisfy w < r and will
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therefore be the solution to
ye(q, e˜(w, r, λ)−)e˜w(w, r, λ)− − s′(w) ≤ 0,
with equality if w > w(r, λ) (recall from the proof of Theorem 1 that this is either zero
or the wage below which effort takes the boundary value of zero). To account for the fact
that the firm may pay the ‘lowest feasible wage’ for a range of match productivity, let
q˘(r, λ) = max{0, q : Ψ(w(r, λ); q, r, λ) = 0} (at q˘(r, λ) the firm would want to pay w(r, λ)
and since Ψq > 0 the same will be true for all 0 ≤ q < q˘(r, λ)). For all q˘(r, λ) < q < ql(r, λ)
the optimal wage is given by the displayed first-order condition holding with equality, which
is denoted by w˜(r, q, λ)−. Implicit differentiation and our deductions in the preliminaries
reveal
w˜q(r, q, λ)− = −Ψ
q
Ψw
> 0,
w˜r(r, q, λ)− = −Ψ
r
Ψw
≥ 0, and
w˜λ(r, q, λ)− = −Ψ
λ
Ψw
> 0.
If q ∈ (qu(r),∞] then the definition of qu(r) and the fact that Ψq > 0 can be used to
deduce that lim→0 Ψ(r + , q, r, λ) > 0; since Ψ(w; q, r, λ) is everywhere decreasing in w
the same is true for all w ≤ r and, as such, the optimizing wage must exceed r and will
therefore satisfy
ye(q, e˜(w, r)+)e˜w(w, r)+ − s′(w) = 0.
Letting w˜(q, r)+ denote the solution (which is independent of λ), implicit differentiation
gives
w˜q(r, q)+ > 0 and
w˜r(r, q)+ ≥ 0.
If q ∈ [ql(r, λ), qu(r)] then the fact that Ψq > 0 can be used to deduce that lim→0 Ψ(r−
, q, r, λ) ≥ 0 and lim→0 Ψ(r + , q, r, λ) ≤ 0. That Ψw < 0 for all w 6= r then implies
Ψ(w; q, r, λ) > 0 for all w < r and Ψ(w; q, r, λ) < 0 for all w > r, implying profit is
maximized if and only if w = r.
Finally, if q < q˜(r, λ) then then the employment relationship ends. Implicit differenti-
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ation of the zero profit condition defining the reservation productivity allows us to deduce
that
q˜r(r, λ) = −
piww˜r + pie(e˜r + e˜ww˜r)
piww˜q + piq + piee˜ww˜q
= − w˜
r(piw + piee˜w) + piee˜r
w˜q(piw + piee˜w) + piq
> 0
since piw + piee˜w = 0 from the first-order condition, piq, pie > 0 by Assumption F2 and we
found in Theorem 1 that e˜r < 0. In addition,
q˜λ(r, λ) = −
piww˜λ + pie(e˜λ + e˜ww˜λ)
piww˜q + piq + piee˜ww˜q
= − w˜
λ(piw + piee˜w) + piee˜λ
w˜q(piw + piee˜w) + piq
Again piw + piee˜w = 0 and piq, pie > 0, and we found in Theorem 1 that when w > r e˜ is
independent of λ, but when w < r, e˜λ < 0. As such, if w˜(r, q˜(r, λ)) > r then q˜λ(r, λ) = 0
but when w˜(r, q˜(r, λ)) < r, q˜λ(r, λ) > 0.
The wage setting rule when the support of the match productivity distribution is [q, q¯]. For
completeness, we elucidate the details of relaxing our simplifying assumption that the
support of the distribution of match productivity is [0,∞], and rather suppose it is [q, q¯].
If this is the case, the definition of the reservation productivity becomes
q˜(r, λ) = max{q, q : pi(w˜(r, q, λ); q, e˜(w˜(r, q, λ), r, λ)) = 0},
and the lower and upper thresholds of match productivity that characterize the wage
setting rule are defined as
ql(r, λ) = min{max{q, q : lim
→0
Ψ(r − ; q, r, λ) = 0}, q¯}, and
qu(r) = min{max{q, q : lim
→0
Ψ(r + ; q, r, λ) = 0}, q¯}.
The form of these thresholds then depend on the worker’s reference wage.
Consider first the lower threshold. Define r¯(λ) = {r : lim→0 Ψ(r − , q¯, r, λ) = 0} and
r˜(λ) = {r : lim→0 Ψ(r − , q, r, λ) = 0}. If r > r¯(λ) then our deduction in the proof
of Theorem 2 that lim→0
dΨ(r±;q,r,λ)
dr = y
ee˜ww± < 0 and the fact that Ψq > 0 implies
lim→0 Ψ(r − , q, r, λ) < 0 for all q < q¯ and we define ql(r, λ) = q¯ (the firm will always
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want to set the wage below the (high) reference wage). If r < r˜(λ) then we can similarly
deduce that lim→0 Ψ(r − , q, r, λ) > 0 for all q > q and we define ql(r, λ) = q (the firm
will never want to set the wage below the (low) reference wage). Thus,
ql(r, λ) =

q if r < r˜(λ)
{q : lim→0 Ψ(r − , q, r, λ) = 0} if r˜(λ) ≤ r ≤ r¯(λ)
q¯ if r > r¯(λ)
Turning next to the upper threshold, define r˜ = {r : lim→0 Ψ(r + ; q¯, r, λ) = 0} and
r = {r : lim→0 Ψ(r + ; q, r, λ) = 0}. If r > r˜ then our previously cited monotonicity
statements allow us to deduce that lim→0 Ψ(r + ; q, r, λ) < 0 for all q < q¯ and so we
define qu(r) = q¯. If r < r, lim→0 Ψ(r+ ; q, r, λ) > 0 for all q > q and we define ql(r) = q.
As such,
qu(r) =

q if r < r
{q : lim→0 Ψ(r + , q, r, λ) = 0} if r ≤ r ≤ r˜
q¯ if r > r˜
The fact deduced in the preliminaries of the proof of Theorem 2 that lim→0 Ψ(r −
; q, r, λ) > lim→0 Ψ(r+; q, r, λ) when λ > 1, along with our observation that lim→0
dΨ(r±;q,r,λ)
dr <
0, allows us to conclude that r < r˜(λ) and r˜ < r¯(λ).
FIGURE VI HERE.
The nature of the productivity thresholds that define the range of rigidity depend
on the worker’s reference wage, which are illustrated in Figure VI, along with a typical
reservation productivity q˜(r, λ) that also depends on the reference wage. For workers for
whom λ > 1, if r > r¯(λ) (defined above as the reference wage where ql(r, λ) = q¯) then the
firm will always want to reduce the wage below the reference wage; and if r < r (defined
as the reference wage where qu(r) = q) the firm will always want to increase the wage
above the reference wage. If the reference wage is either particularly low or particularly
high there is no range of rigidity. However, for r < r < r¯(λ) there will be a non-empty
range of match productivity in which the wage paid will be the same, so long as offering a
contract that pays r to a worker whose productivity is qu(r) gives strictly positive profit
(otherwise all contracts within the range of rigidity are unprofitable).
Consequently, in this more general case there is a non-empty range of reference wages
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in which the optimal wage contract will exhibit wage rigidity for loss averse workers, but
outside this range wage rigidity is not a feature of the wage setting rule.
Corollary 1. If λ > 1, r < r < r¯(λ) and q˜(r, λ) < qu(r) there is a non-empty range
of match productivity within which otherwise identical workers are paid the same wage,
equal to their reference wage. The more loss averse a worker is the greater the range of
rigidity and the higher will be their wage in the case of a wage cut, but the range of match
productivity over which the employment relationship continues shrinks.
Proof of Proposition 1. If in the first period the match productivity falls short of the reser-
vation productivity with the updated reference wage, i.e. q1 < q˜(w0, λ), then contracting
with the worker for the final period would be unprofitable and the contract terminated;
the employment relationship only has value for q1 ≥ q˜(w0, λ). As noted,
E0[J1(w0, q1)] =
∫ max{q˜(w0,λ),ql(w0,λ)}
q˜(w0,λ)
J1(w0, q1)
−dF+
∫ max{q˜(w0,λ),qu(w0)}
max{q˜(w0,λ),ql(w0,λ)}
J1(w0, q1)
=dF
+
∫ ∞
max{q˜(w0,λ),qu(w0)}
J1(w0, q1)
+dF
where J1(w0, q1)
−;=;+ represents the value of the contract if w1 < w0;w1 = w0;w1 > w0,
in which effort is given by e˜(w1, w0, λ)
−; e˜n; e˜(w1, w0)+. (In subsequent proofs we are less
pedantic and assume q˜(w0, λ) < ql(w0, λ).)
Let I− be an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if q˜(w0, λ) < ql(w0, λ) and is oth-
erwise zero; I= an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if ql(w0, λ) ≤ q˜(w0, λ) ≤ qu(w0)
and is otherwise zero; and I+ an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if q˜(w0, λ) >
qu(w0) and is otherwise zero. Note that one, and only one, of I−, I= and I+ is equal to 1.
The marginal change in the value of the first-period employment contract (dropping the
arguments of productivity thresholds) is
θ(w0, λ) =
∫ max{q˜,ql}
q˜
Jr11 (w0, q1)
−dF
+ I−[qrl lim
→0
J1(w0, ql − )−f(ql)− q˜rJ1(w0, q˜)f(q˜)]
+
∫ max{q˜,qu}
max{q˜,ql}
Jr11 (w0, q1)
=dF
+ I=[q′uJ1(w0, qu)=f(qu)− q˜rJ1(w0, q˜)f(q˜)] + I−[q′uJ1(w0, qu)=f(qu)− qrl J1(w0, ql)=f(ql)]
+
∫ ∞
max{q˜,qu}
Jr11 (w0, q1)
+dF
− I+q˜rJ1(w0, q˜)f(q˜)− (1− I+)q′u lim→0 J1(w0, qu + )+f(qu).
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By definition, J1(w0, q˜) = 0, and the continuity of the optimal effort function and wage
setting rule imply lim→0 J1(w0, ql − )− = J1(w0, ql)= and lim→0 J1(w0, qu + )+ =
J1(w0, qu)
=. It then follows for each of the three scenarios (I− = 1; I= = 1; I+ = 1),
after cancelling terms, that
θ(w0, λ) =
∫ ∞
q˜ J
r1
1 (w0, q1)dF.
Now, for q1 ∈ [q˜(w0, λ),∞] \ [ql(w0, λ), qu(w0)] (i.e. where the wage is not equal to the
reference wage)
Jr11 (r1, q1) = pi
ww˜r + pie(e˜ww˜r + e˜r) (9)
= piee˜r < 0, (10)
since from the first-order condition piw+piee˜w = 0 (assuming w˜1 > w(w0, λ) so the solution
is interior) and we deduced in Theorem 1 that e˜r < 0. For q1 ∈ [ql(w0, λ), qu(w0)] the wage
is equal to the reference wage and effort is constant and equal to e˜n, so J
r1
1 (r1, q1) = pi
w < 0.
As such,
θ(w0, λ) =
∫ ql
q˜ pi
ee˜rdF +
∫ qu
ql
piwdF +
∫ ∞
qu
piee˜rdF < 0. (11)
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof is qualitatively similar to the proof of Theorem 2, so the
details are largely omitted. Let us, however, dwell on the assumption that Ψw + δθw0 < 0.
We know from the proof of Theorem 2 that Ψ(w; q0, r0, λ) is decreasing in w as Ψ
w < 0
for w 6= r and at w = r there is a jump down. Recalling the expression for θ(w0, λ) in (11)
and recognising that both the integrand (except in the case of q1 ∈ [ql(w0, λ), qu(w0)]) and
the limits of integration depend on w0, we deduce that
θw0 =
∫ ql
q˜
d
dr
{piee˜r}dF + qrl pie lim
→0
e˜r(w0 − , w0, λ)f(ql)− q˜rpiee˜rf(q˜)
+ q′upi
wf(qu)− qrl piwf(ql)
+
∫ ∞
qu
d
dr
{piee˜r}dF − q′upie lim
→0
e˜r(w0 + , w0, λ)f(qu).
Now, from the expressions for e˜w and e˜r in the proof of Theorem 1 it follows that
lim→0 e˜r(w0 ± , w0, λ) = − lim→0 e˜w(w0 ± , w0, λ). Moreover, when w 6= r the first-
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order condition holds with equality, which implies that piee˜w = −piw. These statements
together give us pie lim→0 e˜r(w0 ± , w0, λ) = piw, which allows several terms to cancel in
the above expression. Noting that ddr{piee˜r} = piee˜rr + piee(e˜r)2 then allows us to conclude
that
θw0 =
∫ ql
q˜ (pi
ee˜rr + piee(e˜r)2)dF +
∫ ∞
qu
(piee˜rr + piee(e˜r)2)dF − q˜rpiee˜rf(q˜).
We know from Theorem 1 that e˜r < 0 and e˜rr > 0, and from Theorem 2 that q˜r > 0. As
such, the sign of the second derivative of the expected future profit function with respect
to the initial wage remains undetermined. To proceed, it is not necessary to assume that
θw0 < 0, but we do need to assume that Ψw + δθw0 < 0, which we find reasonable. Since
Ψw < 0 the inequality will be true for a sufficiently impatient firm, but our conjecture
is |Ψw| > |θw0 |, since we believe the direct current effect of a change in the wage on this
period will be larger than the expected effect in the future that comes indirectly through
this period’s wage becoming the future reference wage (which is also discounted), and
therefore even if θw0 > 0 we will have Ψw + δθw0 < 0.
Under this assumption the proof of the nature of the wage setting rule follows the same
steps as the proof of Theorem 2 where Ψ is replaced with Ψ + δθ.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof relies on investigation of the first-order condition of the
two optimization problems, noting from Proposition 1 that θ(w0, λ) < 0. First we show
that qˆl(r, λ, δ) > q˜l(r, λ). Suppose, by contradiction, that qˆl ≤ q˜l, then the fact that Ψq > 0
(see the preliminaries in the proof of Theorem 2) implies
0 ≡ lim
→0
Ψ(r − ; q˜l, r, λ) ≥ lim
→0
Ψ(r − , qˆl, r, λ),
but then since θ(w, λ) < 0 we have that
lim
→0
Ψ(r − , qˆl, r, λ) > lim
→0
Ψ(r − , qˆl, r, λ) + δθ(w, λ) ≡ 0,
yielding a contradiction. That qˆu(r, λ, δ) > q˜u(r) is similarly proved.
We now want to compare wˆ(r, q, λ, δ)−;+ with w˜(r, q, λ)−;+ where both functions are
defined. We demonstrate that wˆ(r, q, λ, δ)− < w˜(r, q, λ)− for all q < q˜l(r, λ). Suppose, by
contradiction, that wˆ− ≥ w˜−. Then the fact that Ψw < 0 (see the preliminaries in the
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proof of Theorem 2) implies
0 ≡ Ψ(w˜−; q, r, λ) ≥ Ψ(wˆ−; q, r, λ),
but then θ(w0, λ) < 0 implies
Ψ(wˆ−; q, r, λ) > Ψ(wˆ−; q, r, λ) + δθ(r, λ) ≡ 0,
yielding a contradiction. The proof that wˆ(r, q, λ, δ)+ < w˜(r, q, λ)+ for all q > qˆu(r, λ, δ)
is similar and so omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3. First consider how the optimal wage changes with the degree of
loss aversion. Implicit differentiation of the wage setting rule gives
wˆλ = − Ψ
λ + δθλ
Ψw + δθw
.
We assume the denominator is negative, and we know from the preliminaries in the proof
of Theorem 2 that Ψλ = 0 if w ≥ r and Ψλ > 0 if w < r. Recalling the definition of
θ(w0, λ) in (11) and noting that pi
w and qu are independent of λ, we deduce that
θλ =
∫ ql
q˜
d
dλ
{piee˜r}dF + qλl pie lim
→0
e˜r(w0 − , w0, λ)f(ql)− q˜λpiee˜rf(q˜)
− qλl piwf(ql)
+
∫ ∞
qu
d
dλ
{piee˜r}dF
Now, qλl pi
e lim→0 e˜r(w0 − , w0, λ) − qλl piw = 0 since as we deduced previously for w ≈ r,
piee˜r ≈ piw. Moreover, ddλ{piee˜r} = pieee˜λe˜r + piee˜rλ which, according to our deductions in
Theorem 1, is equal to zero for wages exceeding the reference wage. As such,
θλ =
∫ ql
q˜ (pi
eee˜λe˜r + piee˜rλ)dF − q˜λpiee˜rf(q˜).
In Theorem 1 we concluded that e˜λ, e˜r, e˜rλ < 0. As such, if the layoff reservation pro-
ductivity doesn’t increase too much, i.e. q˜λ > 0 is sufficiently small, then θλ < 0, which
allows us to conclude the statements regarding the wage in the proposition.
Next consider the reservation productivity in the subsequent employment contract
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governing layoff behavior, which is
q˜(wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ), λ) = max{0, q1 : J1(wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ), q1) = 0}.
Noting that
J1(wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ), q1) = pi(w˜(wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ), q1, λ); q1, e˜(w˜(wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ), q1, λ), wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ), λ)),
implicit differentiation reveals
dq˜
dλ
= −pi
w(w˜rwˆλ + w˜λ) + pie(e˜w(w˜rwˆλ + w˜λ) + e˜rwˆλ + e˜λ)
piww˜q + piq + piee˜ww˜q
= −(pi
w + piee˜w)(w˜rwˆλ + w˜λ) + pie(e˜rwˆλ + e˜λ)
(piw + piee˜w)w˜q + piq
= −pi
e(e˜rwˆλ + e˜λ)
piq
after utilizing the fact that in the subsequent employment contract piw + piee˜w = 0. We
know from Theorem 1 that e˜r < 0 and e˜λ < 0 when w < r (which is the case here since
we are supposing q˜(w0, λ) < ql(w0, λ)), which allows us to conclude the statement in the
proposition.
The reservation productivity governing hiring behavior in the initial contract is
qˆ˜(r, λ, δ) = {q0 : pi(wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ); q0, e˜(wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ), r0, λ))+δE0[J1(wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ), q1)] = 0}.
Implicit differentiation reveals
dqˆ˜
dλ
= −pi
wwˆλ + pie(e˜wwˆλ + e˜λ) + δ dE0[J1(wˆ(r0,q0,λ,δ),q1)]dλ
piwwˆq0 + piq + piee˜wwˆq0 + δ dE0[J1(wˆ(r0,q0,λ,δ),q1)]dq0
= −pi
ee˜λ + wˆλ(piw + piee˜w) + δ dE0[J1(wˆ(r0,q0,λ,δ),q1)]dλ
piq + wˆq0(piw + piee˜w) + δ dE0[J1(wˆ(r0,q0,λ,δ),q1)]dq0
Letting pi−;=;+ be the profit function when w1 < w0;w1 = w0;w1 > w0, in which effort
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is given by e˜(w1, w0, λ)
−; e˜n; e˜(w1, w0)+, we have
dE0[J1]
dλ
=
∫ ql
q˜
dpi−
dλ
dF −
dq˜
dλ
pi|q=q˜f(q˜) +
dql
dλ
pi=f(ql)
+
∫ qu
ql
dpi=
dλ
dF +
dqu
dλ
pi=f(qu)− dql
dλ
pi=f(ql)
+
∫ ∞
qu
dpi+
dλ
dF − dqu
dλ
pi=f(qu).
Noting that pi|q=q˜ ≡ 0 and the other effects on the limits of integration cancel out, this
reduces to
dE0[J1]
dλ
=
∫ ql
q˜
dpi−
dλ
dF +
∫ qu
ql
dpi=
dλ
dF +
∫ ∞
qu
dpi+
dλ
dF.
Now,
dpi−;+
dλ
= piw(w˜rwˆλ + w˜λ) + pie(e˜w(w˜rwˆλ + w˜λ) + e˜rwˆλ + e˜λ)
= pie(e˜rwˆλ + e˜λ)
since piw + piee˜w = 0. However, within the range of rigidity we have
dpi=
dλ
= piwwˆλ.
Note that wˆλ doesn’t depend on q1 and e˜
λ = 0 when the wage exceeds the reference wage.
Then, recalling the expression for θ(w0, λ) in (11), we have that
dE0[J1]
dλ
=
∫ ql
q˜
pie(e˜rwˆλ + e˜λ)dF +
∫ qu
ql
piwwˆλdF +
∫ ∞
qu
piee˜rwˆλdF
= wˆλθ +
∫ ql
q˜
e˜λdF
This allows us to conclude that
piee˜λ + wˆλ(piw + piee˜w) + δ
dE0[J1(wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ), q1)]
dλ
= wˆλ(piw + piee˜w + δθ) + piee˜λ + δ
∫ ql
q˜
piee˜λdF
= piee˜λ + δ
∫ ql
q˜
piee˜λdF
since the first-order condition for the initial employment contract implies piw+piee˜w+δθ =
0.
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Similar deductions allow us to conclude that dE0[J1]dq0 = wˆ
q0θ, and therefore that
piq + wˆq0(piw + piee˜w) + δ
dE0[J1(wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ), q1)]
dq0
= wˆq0(piw + piee˜w + δθ) + piq
= piq.
As such,
dqˆ˜
dλ
= −
piee˜λ + δ
∫ ql
q˜ pi
ee˜λdF
piq
> 0
since we know from Theorem 1 that when the wage is below the reference wage e˜λ < 0.
In summary, the hiring reservation productivity is unambiguously larger for a more
loss averse worker; the layoff reservation productivity will also increase if either the firm
pays a higher wage in the initial wage contract, or the direct effect of loss aversion on
effort dominates the indirect effect.
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Figure I:
Asymmetric Reference-dependent Reciprocity
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Figure II:
The Wage Setting Rule for a Loss Averse Worker whose Reference Wage is r. The thick
dotted line represents w˜(r, q)+ and the thin dotted line w˜(r, q, λ)−.
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Figure III:
Employment Relationship Time-line.
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Figure IV:
Adaptation and Downward Wage Rigidity when a Worker is Initially Paid Above their
Reference Wage.
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Figure V:
Adaptation and Upward Wage Rigidity when a Worker is Initially Paid Below their
Reference Wage.
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Figure VI:
The Range of Rigidity with a Truncated Support of the Match Productivity Distribution.
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